Arzu v American Airlines, No 25-10606 (5th Circuit 2026)
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Facts
At pages 1 and 2:
At 14, Kevin Greenidge tragically died on an American Airlines flight after his heart stopped. His aunt, Melissa Arzu, sued to hold American liable under the Montreal Convention, an international treaty that holds an airline strictly liable for an injury caused by an “accident”—an unexpected or unusual event external to the passenger—on an international flight. Arzu maintains that the flight crew’s arguably imperfect medical response, which allegedly violated American policy, was an accident under Article 17 of the Convention.
See further pages 2 to 4:
In June 2022, Kevin Greenidge boarded an American Airlines flight from Honduras to Florida with his family. Kevin was in poor health. At 14, he weighed 319 pounds and was only 5 feet 6 inches tall. He had asthma, high blood pressure, Type II diabetes and sleep apnea.
Forty-five minutes after takeoff, Kevin began struggling to breathe and asked for his inhaler. The inhaler did not help. Swiftly, he clutched his chest and lost consciousness. His aunt and uncle cried for help.
Arguably, the initial response was chaotic. Kevin lost consciousness during the drinks service. This meant that the drinks carts obstructed the flight attendants’ paths towards Kevin. Flight attendant Judy Gilbert-Blanchard responded first. Flight attendant De Fitzpatrick arrived second, after clambering over a cart. They found Kevin unresponsive, so Gilbert-Blanchard called a Code Red—a medical emergency.
With difficulty, Fitzpatrick and two passengers extricated Kevin from his seat. At the same time, flight attendant Brooke Anderson fetched an automated external defibrillator (AED) and a medical kit. The cabin crew also sought medical help over the intercom.
Two medical professionals responded: a nurse, Karenna Thatcher, and a surgical resident, Dr Rachel Amador. When Dr Amador arrived, she saw “a lot of commotion . . . [and] nothing was really being done”. She took charge. She directed the flight attendants and nearby passengers to move Kevin to the aft galley. It took at least three people several minutes to carry him there.
Once they arrived, Dr Amador and nurse Thatcher began cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), with Fitzpatrick’s help. Anderson soon arrived with the AED.
The parties dispute whether the AED malfunctioned. Its pads initially had trouble sticking to Kevin. Once they attached, the AED analysed his heart rhythm. Because Kevin was asystolic, meaning that there was no cardiac electrical activity, it advised that CPR be continued. […] After eight minutes, the AED detected a shockable rhythm and advised a shock. Fitzpatrick pressed the shock button.
The AED’s internal data recorded a shock. However, four witnesses, including Dr Amador and nurse Thatcher, testified that Kevin received no shock.
Only after retrieving the AED did Anderson alert the pilots. Although the pilots never contacted the Physician on Call, […] they diverted to Cancun immediately. The flight landed 17 minutes later. By then, Kevin was dead.
Issue(s)
Two issues were raised:
(1) First, whether an imperfect medical response on the part of the crew was capable of constituting an accident under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention?
(2) Second, whether, in particular, a faulty AED was relevant such that it could constitute an accident, being an unexpected or unusual event external to the passenger?
Discussion
With regards to the first issue, the Fifth Circuit upheld summary judgment granted in favour of the carrier defendant, see pages 7 to 9:
The inquiry is whether the underlying events are “unexpected or unusual.” See Saks, 470 U.S. at 405. Even crediting Arzu’s version, the crew’s response does not meet that standard.
Crew inaction can be an Article 17 accident. Blansett, 379 F.3d at 181. But “unusual circumstances” must “elevate the willing inaction of airline personnel from mere inertia—from a non-event—to an event both unexpected and unusual.” Id. In other words, crew inaction is an accident only when: (1) unusual circumstances elevate it to an unexpected and unusual event, and (2) the inaction is willing. See id.; Husain, 540 U.S. at 651–57.
Husain illustrates this standard. There, a passenger with asthma was sensitive to cigarette smoke. Husain, 540 U.S. at 648–49. Over his protests, flight attendants seated him near the aircraft’s smoking section. Id. at 647. They refused his multiple requests for a new seat. Id. at 647–48. Eventually, he succumbed to his asthma and died. Id. at 648. Because the flight attendant’s willing refusal to reseat him was unexpected and unusual, it was an Article 17 accident. Id. at 651.
Relying on Husain, our court in White rejected a passenger’s claim that the crew’s imperfect medical response was an Article 17 accident. 493 F. App’x at 531–32. There, during the final descent, attendants found a passenger collapsed inside the lavatory. Id. at 527. Although White quibbled with the crew’s emergency response, they removed the passenger from the lavatory, laid her on the floor, gave her oxygen, and “alerted the captain, who notified [airport] medical personnel.” Id. at 528, 530. As a matter of law, these “actions were not so unexpected or unusual” as to be an Article 17 accident. Id. at 532.
White joined a chorus of previous decisions rejecting Article 17 claims based on a crew’s imperfect medical response. See Krys v. Lufthansa Ger. Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515, 1518–22 (11th Cir. 1997) (no accident: crew failed to divert plane after passenger’s heart attack because a physician passenger assured the crew that “there was nothing to worry about”); Hipolito v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 15 F. App’x 109, 111–12 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (no accident: crew provided imperfect medical aid but passenger died of asthma attack); Rajcooar v. Air India Ltd., 89 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (no accident: airline employees failed to timely respond to passenger’s heart attack).
Even crediting Arzu’s version (as we must), she shows only an arguably imperfect response to Kevin’s emergency. There is no genuine dispute that the crew: (1) removed Kevin to the aft galley, (2) secured medical professionals’ help, (3) assisted with CPR, (4) fetched an AED promptly, and (5) alerted the captain, who (6) diverted to the closest airport immediately. These facts track White neatly. 493 F. App’x at 527–28.
True, some evidence suggests that attendant Blanchard could have responded faster. Or Anderson could have alerted the pilots sooner. Or the pilots could have contacted the on-call physician. Yet Arzu identifies no circumstances that elevate the crew’s inaction to “an event both unexpected and unusual.” See Blansett, 379 F.3d at 181 (citation modified). There is no evidence that the flight crew’s response was unusually slow or chaotic compared to other crew’s responses to similar emergencies.
The only unusual circumstance here is the challenge Kevin’s size posed to the response. Although Arzu claims that CPR should have begun immediately, a team performing effective CPR on a 315-pound person in an airplane aisle is implausible. And Kevin’s large frame meant that it took at least three people several minutes to extricate him from his seat and transport him to the aft galley. Even so, the crew provided extensive aid.
With regard to the second issue, the Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment in part. See further page 11 as follows:
[The] […] evidence suggests that American failed to equip the plane with a functional AED. Because FAA regulations are relevant, a reasonable jury could find that this failure was “unusual or unexpected”—and thus an Article 17 accident.
See also pages 12 and 13 as follows:
While violating an FAA regulation is not itself an Article 17 accident, it informs whether an event is unexpected or unusual. Blansett, 379 F.3d at 181–82. And a genuine dispute remains whether American equipped Kevin’s flight with a functional AED, as the FAA requires. From this, a reasonable jury could find that the alleged AED malfunction was an Article 17 accident.
Thus, we reverse summary judgment on Arzu’s Article 17 claim to the extent it relies on the alleged AED malfunction.
Useful for
Imperfect crew response to a medical emergency is by itself not an accident under the Convention
Treaty provisions considered
Legislation considered
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Accident/Appeals history
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