Felicísima v Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España SA (2025) C-218/24 CJEU (7th Chamber)
Court of Justice of the European Union, Seventh Chamber
Facts
14 Felicísima and her mother bought tickets for a flight on 22 October 2019 from Buenos Aires (Argentina) to Barcelona (Spain) operated by Iberia.
15 The passengers travelled with their pet, a dog. Due to its size and weight, the dog was to travel in the hold, in a pet carrier or a special, standardised container. Felicísima checked in the pet carrier containing the dog so that it could be taken to the hold of the aircraft, but she did not make, at the time when the checked baggage was handed over, a special declaration of interest in delivery at destination, within the meaning of Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention.
16 The dog left the pet carrier, ran around in the vicinity of the aircraft and could not be recovered.
17 Felicísima brought an action before the Juzgado de lo Mercantil no 4 de Madrid (Commercial Court No 4, Madrid, Spain), which is the referring court, claiming compensation for her non-material damage which she evaluates at EUR 5000. Iberia accepts its responsibility and Felicísima’s entitlement to compensation, but within the limit laid down in Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention.
18 The referring court is uncertain whether the concept of ‘baggage’, within the meaning of Article 17(2) of the Montreal Convention, excludes pets travelling with passengers, and whether the limit for compensation laid down in Article 22(2) of that convention applies to pets.
19 According to the referring court, since animals are sentient beings, within the meaning of Article 13 TFEU, or sentient living beings, under Spanish law, to which their owners have an emotional connection, the loss of a pet causes psychological distress that is not comparable, generally, to that caused by the loss of a mere collection of things corresponding to the concept of ‘baggage’. In those circumstances, the limit for compensation provided for in Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention does not seem appropriate.
Issue(s)
21 […] the Juzgado de lo Mercantil no 4 de Madrid (Commercial Court No 4, Madrid) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘Must Article 17(2) of the [Montreal Convention], read in conjunction with Article 22(2) of that convention, be interpreted as meaning that the term “baggage”, either checked or unchecked, does not apply to pets?’
Discussion
32 At the outset, it is necessary to discard an interpretation that includes pets within the concept of ‘passengers’, as Article 1 of the Montreal Convention refers specifically to persons and baggage. It thus follows from the clear wording of that provision that the concept of ‘persons’ corresponds to that of ‘passengers’, with the result that a pet cannot be considered to be a ‘passenger’.
33 That interpretation is supported by the travaux préparatoires that led to the adoption of the Montreal Convention, from which it is not apparent that the States Parties intended to regard a pet as a passenger or to make pets subject to the same liability rules as passengers (see, to that effect, minutes of the meetings of the Plenary Commission of 10 to 28 May 1999, International Conference on Air Law, Montreal, 10 to 28 May 1999, Doc 9775-DC/2, Vol. I, minutes, Vol. II, documents, and Vol. III, travaux préparatoires).
34 Therefore, it must be held that, for the purposes of air travel, a pet falls within the concept of ‘baggage’ and compensation for the damage resulting from the loss of a pet during air travel is subject to the liability rules for baggage, laid down in Article 17(2) and Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention.
35 That interpretation is supported by the objectives which governed the adoption of the Montreal Convention.
36 According to the third paragraph of the preamble to that convention, the States Parties, recognising ‘the importance of ensuring protection of the interests of consumers in international carriage by air and [of] the need for equitable compensation based on the principle of restitution’, decided to lay down a system of strict liability for air carriers. A system of that kind implies, however, as is apparent from the fifth paragraph of the preamble to that convention, that an ‘equitable balance of interests’ be maintained, in particular the interests of air carriers and of passengers (judgment of 6 July 2023, Austrian Airlines (First aid on board an aircraft), C-510/21, EU:C:2023:550, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
37 In order to maintain such a balance, the Montreal Convention makes provision for the liability of air carriers to be limited in certain situations – in particular, in accordance with Article 22(2) of that convention, in the case of destruction or loss of, damage to or delay of baggage – with the resulting limitation of compensation to be applied ‘per passenger’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 2012, Espada Sánchez and Others, C-410/11, EU:C:2012:747, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
38 A limitation of the compensation so designed enables passengers to be compensated easily and swiftly, yet without imposing a very heavy compensation burden on air carriers, which would be difficult to determine and to calculate, and would be liable to undermine, and even paralyse, the economic activity of those carriers (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 May 2010, Walz, C-63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraph 36, and of 19 December 2019, Niki Luftfahrt, C-532/18, EU:C:2019:1127, paragraph 40).
39 In the present case, as is apparent from the information provided by the referring court, the applicant in the main proceedings checked in the pet carrier containing her pet, without making a special declaration of interest in delivery at destination at the time when the checked baggage was handed over, within the meaning of Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention.
40 In that regard, the Court has interpreted Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention as meaning that, in the carriage of baggage, the liability of an air carrier in the case of destruction, loss, damage or delay ‘is limited’, from 30 December 2009 until 28 December 2019, to the sum of 1131 SDRs per passenger, but also that the limit laid down in that provision constitutes a maximum limit for compensation which cannot accrue automatically and in full to any passenger, even in the event of loss of his or her baggage (judgment of 9 July 2020, Vueling Airlines, C-86/19, EU:C:2020:538, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
41 The Court has also noted that the possibility for the passenger to make a special declaration of interest at the time when the checked baggage is handed over to the carrier, under Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention, confirms that the limit of an air carrier’s liability for the loss of baggage is, in the absence of any special declaration of interest in delivery at destination, an absolute limit which includes both non-material and material damage (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2020, Vueling Airlines, C-86/19, EU:C:2020:538, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
42 Therefore, where a passenger considers that the limit of an air carrier’s liability for the damage resulting from the loss of baggage is insufficient, he or she has the possibility, in accordance with Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention, to increase that limit by making such a special declaration of interest in delivery at destination and by paying a supplementary sum if the case so requires, subject to the approval of the air carrier.
43 Lastly, the interpretation set out in paragraph 34 of the present judgement cannot be called into question by the wording of Article 13 TFEU relied on by the referring court, according to which, in formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture, fisheries, transport, internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the Union and the Member States must, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.
44 In that regard, it is clear both from the case-law of the Court and from Article 13 TFEU that the protection of animal welfare is an objective of general interest recognised by the European Union (judgment of 29 February 2024, cdVet Naturprodukte, C-13/23, EU:C:2024:175, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
45 Nevertheless, Article 13 TFEU does not prevent animals from being transported as ‘baggage’, within the meaning of Article 17(2) of the Montreal Convention, and from being regarded as such within the framework of the system of liability established by that convention, upon the condition that full regard is paid to animal welfare requirements while they are being transported.
46 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that Article 17(2) of the Montreal Convention, read in conjunction with Article 22(2) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that pets are not excluded from the concept of ‘baggage’ within the meaning of those provisions.
Useful for
Pets can constitute baggage under the Convention
Treaty provisions considered
Legislation considered
None identified.Key subjects or concepts
Baggage/ Damages/ Exclusivity/ Mental Injury/Appeals history
No relevant appeals or appeal history identified for this case.Other case information
Lawyers or counsel before the Court of Justice of the European Union, Seventh Chamber:No counsel or legal team identified for this case.
Additional case references or citations:
ECLI:EU:C:2025:794
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