GN v ZU (2019) C-532/18 CJEU (4th Chamber)
European Court of Justice, Fourth Chamber
Facts
13 In 2015, GN, the applicant, who was then 6 years old, travelled on board an aircraft with her father, HM, next to whom she was sitting. The journey between Mallorca (Spain) and Vienna (Austria) was operated by Niki Luftfahrt.
14 During the flight, HM was served a cup of hot coffee which, while it was placed upon the tray table in front HM, tipped over onto his right thigh and onto GN’s chest, causing her second-degree scalding.
15 It could not be established whether the cup of coffee tipped over due to a defect in the folding tray table on which it was placed or due to vibration of the aircraft.
16 The applicant, represented for legal purposes by her father, filed a claim on the basis of Article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention seeking that the now insolvent carrier be ordered to pay compensation for the harm caused to her, estimated at EUR 8 500.
17 The defendant contends that, because there was no accident, it cannot be held liable under that provision. No sudden and unexpected incident led to the sliding of the cup of coffee and the spillage of its contents. According to the defendant, the concept of ‘accident’ within the meaning of Article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention requires the materialisation of a hazard typically associated with aviation, a condition that was not fulfilled in the present case.
Issue(s)
27 In those circumstances, the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
‘Where a cup of hot coffee, which is placed on the tray table of the seat in front of a person in an aircraft in flight, for unknown reasons slides and tips over, causing a passenger to suffer scalding, does this constitute an “accident” triggering a carrier’s liability within the meaning of Article 17(1) of the [Montreal Convention]?’
Discussion
33 In the present case, it is apparent from the wording of Article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention that, in order to engage the liability of the carrier, the event causing the death or bodily injury of the passenger must be classified as an ‘accident’ and that accident must take place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
34 Since the concept of ‘accident’ is not defined anywhere in the Montreal Convention, reference must be made to the ordinary meaning of that concept in its context, in the light of the object and purpose of that convention.
35 The ordinary meaning given to the concept of ‘accident’ is that of an unforeseen, harmful and involuntary event.
36 Furthermore, in accordance with the third paragraph of the preamble to the Montreal Convention, the States Parties, recognising ‘the importance of ensuring protection of the interests of consumers in international carriage by air and the need for equitable compensation based on the principle of restitution’, decided to lay down a system of strict liability for air carriers. A system of that kind implies, however, as is apparent from the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the Montreal Convention, that an ‘equitable balance of interests’ be maintained, in particular the interests of air carriers and of passengers (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 May 2010, Walz, C-63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraphs 31 and 33, and of 22 November 2012, Espada Sánchez and Others, C-410/11, EU:C:2012:747, paragraphs 29 and 30).
37 In that regard, it is clear from the travaux préparatoires that led to the adoption of the Montreal Convention that the concept of ‘accident’ was preferred by the contracting parties to the concept of ‘event’ proposed in the original draft (see, inter alia, the opinion submitted by the International Union of Aviation Insurers, DCW Doc No 28, 13 May 1999, and the report of the Rapporteur on the Modernization and Consolidation of the Warsaw System, C-WP/10576). The reason for that preference is that the term ‘event’ was considered too broad, encompassing all circumstances and liable to result in excessive litigation.
38 By contrast, it was decided, following the change in the use of that word, to delete the last sentence of Article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention, which provided that the carrier was not liable in so far as the death or injury resulted from the passenger’s state of health. It was considered, in essence, that keeping such an exoneration would unbalance the interests at stake to the detriment of the passenger and that, in any event, the convention already laid down a general exoneration clause in Article 20 thereof.
39 That is why, in order to maintain such balance, the Montreal Convention provides that, in certain circumstances, the carrier may be exonerated from its liability or its obligation to pay compensation may be limited. Article 20 of the convention provides that, if the carrier proves that the damage was caused or contributed to by the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the passenger, the carrier is to be wholly or partly exonerated from its liability to that passenger. Moreover, it is apparent from Article 21(1) of that convention that the air carrier may not exclude or limit its liability for damages arising under Article 17(1) of that convention where those damages do not exceed a certain compensation threshold. It is only above that threshold that the air carrier may exclude its liability pursuant to Article 21(2) by proving that the damage was not caused by its negligence or that it was caused solely by the negligence of a third party.
40 Those limits enable passengers to be compensated easily and swiftly, yet without imposing a very heavy compensation burden on air carriers, which would be difficult to determine and to calculate, and would be liable to undermine, and even paralyse, the economic activity of those carriers (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 May 2010, Walz, C-63/09, EU:C:2010:251, paragraphs 34 to 36, and of 22 November 2012, Espada Sánchez and Others, C-410/11, EU:C:2012:747, paragraph 30).
41 It follows that, as the Advocate General observes in point 60 of his Opinion, making the carrier’s liability subject to the condition that the damage is due to the materialisation of a hazard typically associated with aviation or to there being a connection between the ‘accident’ and the operation or movement of the aircraft is not consistent with the ordinary meaning of the concept of ‘accident’ referred to in Article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention or the objectives pursued by that convention.
42 Furthermore, limiting the obligation on air carriers to pay compensation solely to accidents related to a hazard typically associated with aviation is not necessary in order to avoid imposing an excessive compensation burden on air carriers. As noted in paragraph 39 of the present judgment, those carriers may exclude or limit their liability.
43 In those circumstances, the answer to the question referred is that Article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘accident’ within the meaning of that provision covers all situations occurring on board an aircraft in which an object used when serving passengers has caused bodily injury to a passenger, without it being necessary to examine whether those situations stem from a hazard typically associated with aviation.
Useful for
Accident must occur on aircraft or in process of embarking or disembarking
Accident requires unexpected or unusual event that is external to the passenger
Treaty provisions considered
Legislation considered
None identified.Key subjects or concepts
Accident/ Bodily Injury/ Damages/ Scope under MC99/Appeals history
18 By judgment of 15 December 2015, the Landesgericht Korneuburg (Regional Court, Korneuburg, Austria) upheld the applicant’s claim for compensation. That court took the view that the harm caused to GN stemmed from an accident caused by an unusual event that was based on an external action.
19 That court held that a hazard typically associated with aviation had materialised, since an aircraft is subject to varying, operationally inherent inclinations that could result in objects placed on a horizontal surface in the aircraft starting to slide, without any special manoeuvres being necessary for that to occur. It also found that there was no fault on the part of the defendant, as serving hot drinks without a cover is common practice and socially appropriate.
20 By judgment of 30 August 2016, the Oberlandesgericht Wien (Higher Regional Court, Vienna, Austria) set aside the judgment delivered at first instance. According to that court, Article 17 of the Montreal Convention covers only accidents triggered by a hazard typically associated with aviation and, in the present case, the applicant was unable to adduce any evidence to that effect. In those circumstances, the defendant could not be held liable.
21 The applicant then brought an appeal on a point of law (Revision) before the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria) seeking a declaration that the carrier is liable and that her claim for compensation for the harm suffered is well founded.
Other case information
Lawyers or counsel before the European Court of Justice, Fourth Chamber:No counsel or legal team identified for this case.
Additional case references or citations:
GN, represented for legal purposes by HM v ZU, acting as administrator in the insolvency of Niki Luftfahrt GmbH, Case C-532/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1127.
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